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2 their replicas in markets where the intellectual property rights of the original inventor are established -like in the case reported by the French periodical La Machine Moderne. The government of a backward country might tolerate or even foster this illegal behavior of the firms in its jurisdiction because imitating foreign know-how is one of the most promising ways to catch up to the economically and therefore politically leading nations. However, this kind of illegal imitation usually only takes place during a transitional period. On the longer run, both the firms and the government of the economically advancing country face strong incentives to change their behavior from violating to respecting international intellectual property rights.
To elaborate this argument, we sub-divide the catching-up process into the three phases imitation, (adaptive) innovation and diffusion. During the imitation phase, firms of the economically backward country use various imitation channels like reverse engineering, attending international exhibitions and foreign firms, analyzing patent specifications, or hiring foreign craftsmen and engineers to learn from their superior foreign competitors. This new knowledge can be profitably used in their home market because the government of the imitating firms does not enforce the intellectual property rights of the foreign firms in its jurisdiction. 5 In the following phase of innovation, the imitating firms adjust the imitated technologies and products to their own technological capabilities and the demand of their home market. During this process of adaptation imitation is abating because the formerly imitating firms gain step by step the competence to develop their own successful innovations.
That is why these firms might now lobby for a functioning domestic patent law which does not discriminate against foreign firms to make sure that, in return, their own intellectual property rights will be guaranteed abroad.
Catching-up, however, is obviously not possible for every country. One of the necessary preconditions for both successful imitations and innovations is the availability of a sufficient stock and structure of human capital. Aghion supposes that during the imitation phase firms rely primarily on workers with secondary education while for innovation workers with tertiary education are needed. 6 As a result, an economically backward country should concentrate first 5 To avoid misunderstandings, we want to stress that technological transfer is seldom a one-way-street. During the catching-up process firms in the technologically leading country might also learn from the activities of their foreign imitators. For this "reverse flow" see Jeremy, D. J. (ed. During the diffusion phase, the competence to develop innovations spill-over to more and more domestic firms which increases both price and Schumpeterian competition between the growing number of efficient and innovative firms in the backward country considerably.
Sometimes, the former backward firms might even take over the global technological leadership and thereby -like the German machine tool makers -change from ruthless imitators to campaigners for the worldwide enforcement of intellectual property rights.
Note that the imitation, innovation and diffusion phases often overlap. Especially during the innovation phase, first, the (illegal) imitation of foreign technology might cease but not totally stop, and, second, the imitation activities between domestic firms might already increase speeding up the diffusion of knowledge. We will see in the following that, in the case of the catching-up process of the German machine tool industry, innovation and diffusion phases in fact took place at the same period of time.
Japanese firms of various sectors went successfully through this whole catching-up process in the second half of the twentieth century; the Chinese case mentioned above is obviously a contemporary example for the beginning of this transition period from backwardness to international competitiveness. We will concentrate on the development of the German In section 2, we will discuss the advantages and shortcomings of the patent data used in this paper. In section 3, we will describe German machine tool makers' catching-up process and the reaction of their American counterparts in detail. Section 4 will conclude.
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The patent data Much is said about the shortcomings of patents as a measure for innovation activities. the machine building industry belongs to the later group but we will see in the following that, at least in our period of observation, German and American machine tool makers not only relied on secrecy but also held a considerable amount of patents. The problem that is addressed in the second part of Griliches' statement is probably the more serious one. Pure patent counts allocate the same weight to every patent, no matter whether it has a high or a low economic value for the patentee. Using the number of patents as an indicator for successful innovation activities therefore leads to a potentially large measurement error. We address this problem by analyzing three different types of patent statistics.
Patents applied for are a measure for inventions which were appraised to be new and potentially profitable by the applying firms. Patents granted, in contrast, are a measure for inventions which were judged to be new by the patent office. Long-lived patents are an indicator for innovations which became in fact profitable. This later group was identified by Streb et al. using a special feature of the German patent law. 12 According to this law, patent protection could last up to fifteen years but was not for free. Rather, the patentee had to pay at the beginning of each year an increasing renewal fee in order to keep his patent in force. This annual renewal fee came to 50 Marks in the first two years, and grew then by 50 Marks each year up to 700 Marks at the beginning of the fifteenth year. Consequently, a patent holder had to decide annually if he was going to renew his patent for another year or not. The outcome of this decision depended on the patentee's expectations about the future returns and costs of holding the patent. The later were determined by the renewal fees and were therefore foreseeable with certainty. In contrast, the future returns, which could result either from selling the innovation as a temporary monopolist or by licensing another producer to do so, A basic question of this life span approach is how many years a patent had to be in force to be interpreted as a valuable patent. Figure 1 shows that about seventy percent of all German patents granted between 1891 and 1907 were already cancelled after just five years. After the fifth year the speed of patent cancellation was decelerating. About 10 percent of all patents were still in force after 10 years, 4.7 percent of all patents reached the maximum age of fifteen years.
As figure 1 also illustrates, Streb et al. decided to use the cut-off point of 10 years to distinguish valuable patents from low-value patents. 13 The choice of this cut-off point was not arbitrary. Pakes observes that the low renewal fees at the beginning of a patent's life allow the inventor to use the patent as a comparatively cheap option that protects the new knowledge and gives him or her the time to learn more about the technological and economic prospects of the invention. 14 In the view of this fact it would be conceivable to interpret those patents that survived this learning process and lived therefore at least about 5 years as the valuable 13 The identification of an individual patent's life span is generally possible because the German patent office published every year the patent numbers of those patents still in force. Since one would have to search for the respective patent number in up to fifteen annual lists, the process of making out the individual life span of one single patent needs at least about 15 minutes. That is why, given the budget constraint of their project, Streb et al. were not able to figure out the exact life span of each of the 800,000 German patents between 1877 and 1932. Choosing instead to use the cut-off point of 10 years, they had to search only for those individual patents that survived at least 10 years. 14 See Pakes, A. (1986 16 -among those all long-lived machine tool patents which were granted to German and foreign machine tool makers.
Figure 2 Three types of patents
Figure 2 makes clear that, in general, the patents granted are a sub set of the patents applied for, and the valuable patents are a much smaller sub set of the patents granted. The relative usefulness of these three patent data sets depends on the particular scientific objective. If a scholar is primarily interested in the firms' invention activities he or she should concentrate 15 See Sullivan, R. J. (1994) . Estimates of the value of patent rights in Great Britain and Ireland, 1852 -1976 . Economica, 61, pp. 37-58. See also Schankerman, M. and Pakes A. (1986 It is important to note that these three types of patents not necessarily display a parallel development over time. Figure 3 shows, for example, that the machine tool makers of the industrial district Chemnitz had a rather constant annual number of valuable patents while their number of patents granted was especially high in the 1890s and the 1920s. It would therefore be wrong to infer from the rising number of patents granted a similar boom of valuable patents and therefore of innovativeness. 1901 1904 1907 1910 1913 1916 1919 1922 1925 1928 1931 Pat ent s grant ed Valuable pat ent s a Source: Baten/Streb patent data base and Richter's patent data.
In this paper, we match the Baten/Streb patent data base (about 66.700 valuable patents for the period 1877-1932) with Richter's patent data about the patenting activities of American and German machine tool makers for four different groups of patent holders which vary in the depth of patent information available:
• 479 German firms which were member of the association of German machine tool makers or were identified as machine tool makers in trade journals. Available are their valuable patents in the German jurisdiction.
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• The subgroup of all German machine tool makers of the industrial district of Chemnitz, the birthplace of the German machine tool industry. In addition to their valuable patents, their patents granted including the application date in the German jurisdiction are known.
• 408 American firms which were member of the Association for Manufacturing
Technology or its predecessor the National Machine Tool Builders Association or were identified as machine tool makers in trade journals. Available are their patents granted including the application date and their valuable patents in the German jurisdiction.
• The subgroup of all American machine tool makers of the industrial district of
Cincinnati which was along with New England and Philadelphia one of the most important focal points of the American machine tool industry. In addition to their patents granted including the application date and their valuable patents in the German jurisdiction, their patents granted including their application date in the American jurisdiction are known.
We will use these four patent data sets to analyze the details of German machine tool makers'
catching-up process in the following section.
The catching-up of the German machine tool makers
By the Paris world exhibition in 1867, German machine tool makers began with imitating American machine tools. 17 The most important imitation channel was reverse engineering.
German firms imported one specimen of a particular machine tool type and used this as a model to copy the whole machine tool or at least some of its main components. Trade fairs and world exhibitions were the second most important information source. 18 German engineers examined innovative foreign machinery on the ground and then prepared written reports about their findings which could also be used by German machine tool makers who had not the funds to travel to the trade fairs and world exhibitions by themselves. International trade journals were also used to learn more about foreign innovations. Already in 1897, the machine tool maker Schubert & Salzer, for example, employed a translator to scrutinize the 10 sixty international trade journals the firm had subscribed to. 19 As an additional written information source, American patent specifications were circulated among the German machine tool makers.
During the intensification of this imitation process the acquirement of personal, often tacit knowledge became more and more important. German entrepreneurs traveled to the United
States to inspect American plants or even to assume a temporary employment there. In a publication commemorating the 50 th anniversary of the firm J.E. Reinecker, for example, it is stressed that this firm owed much of its technological progress to the wide experience the entrepreneur's son gained during his one-year stay in the United States. 20 The same firm hired in 1897 an American expert for machine tool technology who had once presented the innovations of an American firm from Philadelphia at the Chicago world exhibition in 1893. 21 An imitation channel with growing importance were the information about innovative machine tools international resellers distributed among the different firms they represented. The most successful German imitators used these various imitation channels in combination and permanent. Data for the German machine building industry as a whole, presented in figure 4, reveal that this catching-up process, which was not limited to the sub group of machine tool makers, helped to boost the international competitiveness of the German firms in the longer run. In 1885, German machinery exports surpassed imports for the first time.
1901/1902, machinery exports returned to their upward trend while machinery imports stagnated on a low level. Consequently, the export-import ratio more than doubled between 1900 and 1913. According to Reitschuler (1963, p. 253) In the following, we analyze the German machine tool makers' catching-up process on basis of the patent statistics explained in section 2. Figure 5 shows that, measured by the average annual number of valuable patents of the 479 German machine tool makers, we can distinguish five different phases which match our qualitative and anecdotic evidence of the timing of this repeated catching-up process:
• the first imitation period ((Paris world exhibition 1867)/Introduction of the German patent law 1877 to 1899) 25 with 2.4 valuable patents per year,
• the first innovation and diffusion period (1900 to the outbreak of the First World War) with 7.3 valuable patents per year, • the technological setback during the First World War,
• the second imitation period (1919 to 1925) with 6 valuable patents per year, and
• the second innovation and diffusion period (1926 to 1932, which is the last year covered by our data) with 31.1 valuable patents per year.
The fact that, during the first imitation period, German machine tool makers acquired only a few patents that turned out to be worth to be prolonged for at least ten years suggest that, in the late 19 th century, the German firms neglected own R&D projects but relied primarily on imitating foreign products. Obviously, however, learning-by-imitating created on the longer run the competences that were needed to develop successful innovations on one's own account. As a result, the average number of valuable patents per year of the German machine tool industry tripled in the first innovation period in comparison to the preceding first imitation period. The absence of valuable German machine tool patents between 1915 and 1918 in figure 5 does not indicate the total breakdown of innovativeness in this sector but is due to the fact that the German patent office did not publish the name of any patent holder during the First World
War. There are no doubts, however, that the German machine tool makers fell back into 1878  1881  1884  1887  1890  1893  1896  1899 1902 1905 1908 1911 1914 1917 1920 1923 1926 1929 1932 Imitation ( 1901 1903 1905 1907 1909 1911 1913 1915 1917 1919 1921 1923 1925 1927 1929 1931 1933 1935 1937 1939 1941 Year of application Year of granting a Source: Richter's patent data. 1902 1905 1908 1911 1914 1917 1920 1923 1926 1929 1932 a Source: Baten/Streb patent data base and Richter's patent data.
Figures 6 and 7 prove that this expectation is wrong. American firms had a comparatively high number of both German patents granted and valuable German patents not during the two imitation periods but during the two innovation periods. How can this discrepancy between our theoretical expectation and the empirical observation be explained? There are two necessary preconditions for patenting activities in a foreign market. First, an innovator will only be prepared to apply for patent protection in a foreign market after he has learned how to 15 use this instrument in his home market. Second, an innovator has to expect to sell his products in the foreign market at a sales volume that justifies the costs that come along with the patenting activities abroad. Both preconditions were not satisfied during the first imitation period. Figure 8 shows that the newly founded American machine tool makers of the industrial district in Cincinnati intensified their patenting activities in their home market not before the turn of the century.
Their inexperience with respect to patenting at home might explain why they also abstained from patenting activities in Germany before 1900. However, the increasing number of German patents held by American machine tool makers after 1900, proven by figures 6, 7 and 8, is not only the result of growing experience but is probably also owed to the fact that, in this period, Germany has become one of the most important foreign market for American machine tool makers who delivered about one quarter of their total exports to German customers. 29 The increased German demand for their products obviously convinced American 29 See Robertson, R. M. (1966 machine tool makers that it has become profitable to get their innovations patented in the German jurisdiction.
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Interestingly enough, we found no evidence that three of the most notorious German imitators of the first imitation period, namely J. E. Reinecker, Pfauter, and Wanderer Works, maintained their imitation strategies during the first innovation period when these three firms also held patents in the American jurisdiction. As these German firms now had a strong interest that their own patents were respected in their American export market, they abstained in return from violating the intellectual property rights of American firms before the First World War. Figure 9 proves that German machine tool makers increased their exports considerably during both innovation periods. 1 9 0 0 1 9 0 1 1 9 0 2 1 9 0 3 1 9 0 4 1 9 0 5 1 9 0 6 1 9 0 7 1 9 0 8 1 9 0 9 1 9 1 0 1 9 1 1 1 9 1 2 1 9 1 3 1 9 1 4 1 9 2 0 1 9 2 1 1 9 2 2 1 9 2 3 1 9 2 4 1 9 2 5 1 9 2 6 1 9 2 7 1 9 2 8 1 9 2 9 1 9 3 0 1 9 3 1 1 9 3 2 1 9 3 3
German exports (in tons) German imports (in tons) a Statitisches Reichsamt (ed.). Monatliche Nachweise über den auswärtigen Handel Deutschlands. Berlin 1900 -1933 In the light of the increasing success of German firms in the American market, the German government was now also willing to make some concessions to the American patent holders.
Section 11 of the German patent law of 1891 ruled that a patent could be revoked when the patent holder did not manufacture the patented good within the borders of Germany. 31 The purpose of this stipulation was to avert that a foreign patent holder used his German patent only to secure his monopoly in this country but did not employ German labor and did not 30 The average time span the American machine tool makers let pass between the patent application in their home market and the one in the German market decreased from 2. However, since the average time which passed between application and granting was considerably lower for the German firms than for the American firms in both periods, with 1.1 years versus 2.0 years between 1877 and 1918 and 2.3 years versus 3.5 years between 1919 and 1940, a possible alternative interpretation is that the German patent office deliberately delayed the application process of American patents to give the German firms the time they needed to complete their catching-up process. In addition, some American machine tool makers needed more than ten years to fight their cases through the German patent court because several German companies joint in order to prevent American patent applications.
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The problems, American manufacturers had to face when dealing with the German patent office in the 1920s, is illustrated by the experiences of Sol Einstein, design engineer of the We claimed at the beginning of section 3 that the two innovation periods were also periods of knowledge diffusion in which the competences to develop and produce innovative machine tools spill-over to more and more German firms. To check this assumption we calculated for every year t the following Herfindahl-Index H with respect to the valuable patents VP owned by firms i=1...n: The smaller the Herfindahl-Index the more equal is the distribution of valuable patents among those German machine tool makers firms which actually held valuable patents. The Herfindahl-Index comes to one in the case of maximum concentration and to 1/n in the case of an equal distribution of valuable patents. We interpret periods in which the HerfindahlIndex is decreasing as diffusion periods. Figure 12 shows that the Herfindahl-Index is in fact decreasing during the two innovation periods (1900) (1901) (1902) (1903) (1904) (1905) (1906) (1907) (1908) (1909) (1910) (1911) (1912) (1913) (1914) (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) which implies that an increasing number of German machine tool makers were able to develop profitable innovations in these periods. Interestingly enough, the Herfindahl-Index first also falls in the 35 To prove this last conclusion we have to show that the German imitators were more innovative than the German non-imitators. Fortunately, the Industrial Machinery Division of the American Department of Commerce and the National Machine Tool Builders Association compiled a list of the 55 most notorious German imitators. 38 To answer the question whether these imitators were more innovative than the "non-imitating" (or less-imitating) other
German machine tool makers we calculate the annual number of valuable patents per firm for each of these two groups. The results of this calculation are shown in figure 13 . The notorious imitators were far more innovative than the non-imitating firms, especially in the innovation and diffusion periods. We conclude from this finding that the competence to develop 37 William Brown claims "that innovations occurs when the demand for machine tools falls". See Brown, W. (1957 
Conclusions
The technologically backward German machine tool makers successfully used imitating and counterfeiting activities in the late 19 th century and the 1920s to catch-up to their American competitors. The German administration supported this strategy by stipulating a patent law that discriminated against foreign patent holders and probably also by delaying the granting of patents to foreign applicants. Parallel to the growing international competitiveness of German firms, however, the willingness to guarantee intellectual property rights of foreigners was also increasing because German firms had now to fear retaliatory measures in their export markets when violating foreign property rights within Germany.
We interpret this development of the German machine tool industry as a model for other historical, contemporaneous and even future catching-up processes. Developing countries may learn from this example that the strict compliance to the international rules of law with respect to intellectual property rights can slow down the speed of technological and economic 22 progress in their domestic industry. 39 Advanced countries may understand, first, that the owed their own development similar imitating strategies in the past, and, second, that illegal imitation usually only takes place during a transitional period. We predict that the copying and counterfeiting activities of the Chinese machine builders which were momentarily tolerated by the Chinese government will end as soon as the Chinese firms will be able to sell advanced and innovative machinery abroad. Internet www.fzid.uni-hohenheim.de
